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In a series of 18 propositions, the author discusses 
what, in his judgement, are the problems affecting 
planning and what decisions will have to be taken in 
order to deal with them. In his view, planning is an 
important dimension of the capacity to govern and, 
hence, its improvement can only be attained within 
the context of a general improvement in the capacity 
to govern. To this end, the author proposes a selec-
tive and radical strategy for achieving major advan-
ces in a few cruoai components of the 
decision-making process. 
Proposals made with a view to increasing the 
influence of planning in bringing about these advan-
ces include educating political élites to understand 
the planning process more fully and integrating 
planning into decision-making. In addition, plan-
ning must respond to two contradictory demands: 
participation in day-to-day decision-making, on the 
one hand, and the formulation and assessment of 
long-term global strategies, on the other. In order to 
cope with these conflicting requirements, both the 
structure and the techniques of planning will have to 
be adapted, and the author makes a number of sug-
gestions in this regard. 
Other important propositions put forward in 
this article relate, inter alia, to: the author's concept 
of planning as "policy gambling" aimed at dealing 
with the uncertainty and turbulence of present cir-
cumstances; the need to incorporate social interests 
into semi-corporate structures; the creation of spe-
cial organizations for the express purpose of carry-
ing out development strategies for overcoming 
bureaucratic inertia; and the "visionary leadership" 
which should be a feature of planning. 
•Professor of Political Science at Hebrew University 




Planning is a main facet of the "capacity to 
govern", the term "governability" being 
misleading in many respects 
The term "governability", while quite fashiona-
ble, is very misleading in many respects. It 
implies that the present difficulties of govern-
ments result from societies and problems having 
become "ungovernable", the implication there-
fore being that it is up to societies and other 
facets of reality to become "governable". While 
it is true that many societal and other features 
pose serious challenges to governments, the var-
iable which should be considered is the "capacity 
to govern", which may include efforts to make 
society more governable, but which puts the 
onus where it belongs. It is up to governments to 
improve and to develop capacities which enable 
them to fulfill their tasks under more demanding 
conditions. 
"Planning" is a multi-sense term. Neverthe-
less, however, it may be defined for different 
purposes and in various spheres of discourse, 
"planning" implies long-range views, interre-
lated sets of decisions and actions and a high 
quality of professional reasoning. It should be 
added that the idea of planning is not that of 
dirigisme, since different mixes of State and 
market roles serve as options for "planning", 
permitting —and often requiring— various 
forms and modes of planning. 
Correctly understood, the various forms and 
modes of planning constitute an important 
dimension of the capacity to govern. This is all 
the more so when the tasks faced by a society 
require sustained and long-range efforts, as is 
the case with development aspirations. In 
respect to development and to the roles of the 
State in that regard, planning is essential, inter 
alia, to counterbalance political propensities to 
prefer a short-term view. Similarly, the profes-
sional reasoning which goes into planning is 
important in supplying adequate elements of 
"development rationality". Therefore, one of the 
recommended frameworks for a consideration of 
planning within the context of the subject under 
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discussion here is planning as an essential 
dimension of the capacity to govern in general 
The metaphoric concept of the "central mind of 
government", which covers the main central 
government decision-making cluster, is espe-
cially pertinent to planning. To be effective, 
planning must influence the main decision-
making and decision-implementation processes. 
This influence on- decision-making can take a 
variety of forms, ranging from the educating of 
top decision-makers and the public in general as 
well as the reshaping of their congnitive maps 
and attribution theories, to the direct transfor-
mation of planning recommendations into 
authoritative "command decisions". Nonethe-
less, all forms of influence by planning depend 
on interaction with the main decision-making 
and decision-implementation centres and staffs. 
Therefore, planning "must be viewed within the 
context of pol icy-making and policy-
implementing systems as a whole; thus, success 
in augmenting the usefulness of planning will 
depend, inter alia, on the introduction of suitable 
changes in other system components and in the 
systems as a whole which will make them more 
receptive to planning inputs. 
Hence the proposition that the improve-
ment of planning should take place as part of an 
improvement of the central mind of govern-
ment as a whole. It follows that issues relating to 
the upgrading of planning must be considered 
within the context of the broader issues of the 
retrofitting of governance in general and of cen-
tral policy-making and policy-implementing 
systems in particular; otherwise, it will be 
impossible to cope with the difficulties sub-
sumed under the term "ungovernability". 
One important aspect is the idea of a selec-
tively radical reform strategy that goes beyond 
incremental improvements, which usually are 
quite worthless, and that rejects presumptions of 
transforming the entire machinery of govern-
ment, which is usually impossible and often 
and of "development capacities" in the face of 
adverse conditions, in particular. 
unnecessary. Instead, a selectively radical reform 
strategy focuses on the radical improvement of a 
few critical components, with a number of such 
improvements being combined in a modular 
cluster so as to have a significant impact on the 
performance of the system as a whole with the 
aid of a limited, and therefore more feasible, set 
of reforms. 
The selective-radicalism reform strategy 
relates to the upgrading of planning in two main 
ways: first, if our starting point were the upgrad-
ing of the central mind of government, this route 
too would bring us to the necessity of improving 
planning, because planning is an essential mode 
for the formulation of development policies. 
This is important because it justifies efforts to 
improve planning not only from an internal 
view of planning, which axiomatically regards it 
as important, but also from an external view of 
planning, which assigns it importance because of 
the essential functions it fulfils as regards devel-
opment capacity as a whole. 
Second, the selective-radicalism reform stra-
tegy poses the question of what is the minimum 
set of interdependent improvements which will 
be essential for upgrading planning. As indi-
cated above, improving planning, by itself, may 
be useless and even counterproductive unless the 
central mind of government is willing and able 
to utilize planning inputs correctly. Therefore, 
some concomitant changes in other components 
of the central mind of government are needed, in 
addition to improvements in planning activity 
itself. However, when the goal is to improve 
planning, the changes in other dimensions of the 
central mind of government relating to it should 
be kept to an essential minimum so as to ensure 
the feasibility of this task. 
Within such an approach, the components 
of the central mind of government which must 
be upgraded in order to improve planning 
Proposition 2: 
The improvement of planning must take place as part of an effort to upgrade 
the "central mind" of government as a whole, based on a "selective-radicalism" 
strategy for retrofitting the State 
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include, for instance, the qualifications of politi-
cal decision-makers, modes of decision-making 
management, policy-analysis units serving the 
top decision-makers and the interfaces between 
planning and crisis management. The following 
propositions elaborate upon some of the needs 
which are integral to the upgrading of planning 
within the perspectives of the capacity to govern 
and the capacity to engage in accelerated 
development. 
Broader issues of planning and the capacity 
to govern, which are often critical, go beyond the 
scope of this discussion. The elementary needs of 
political stability and the containment of social 
The interrelations between the improvement of 
planning and the upgrading of policy élites, 
including politicians, poses crucial issues. These 
are hard to deal with because of their unconven-
tional nature and the taboos surrounding them. 
To put the matter briefly: one main way for 
planning to exert influence is for it to fulfil 
didactic functions in respect of policy élites, 
including politicians, on the one hand, and the 
public at large, on the other. Furthermore, in 
order for planning to affect reality for the better, 
policy élites, including top-level politicians, 
must be "planning-friendly" in their policy 
behaviour (as distinct from symbolic declara-
tions) and have at least some "planning sophisti-
cation" as part of their intellectual equipment. 
Therefore, the "education" of policy élites, 
and especially top decision-makers, should be 
regarded as one of the main tasks of planning. 
This has many operational implications, such as 
the need for "planning briefing units" which can 
present complex issues and multiple options in 
ways comprehensible to politicians, thus indi-
rectly "educating" them. 
A different and more demanding conclusion 
is that new ways of upgrading the qualifications 
violence are taken up in the examination of 
proposition 18; some relevant issues are dis-
cussed in relation to other propositions as well. 
Useful planning, however, depends on some 
essential aspects of the capacity to govern such as 
adequate governmental power and a wide-
ranging societal consensus. 
Satisfying such requisites must receive prior-
ity over the upgrading of planning; otherwise 
the latter ís irrelevant. Accordingly, in a number 
of countries the upgrading of planning should be 
taken up within a broader approach to the 
"reform of the State", which should be the first 
priority. 
of policy élites need to be devised. This is an 
important and unconventional requirement, 
which needs operationaüzation to clarify its 
implications and feasibility. Accordingly, the 
next proposition presents a concrete proposal to 
set up schools of national policy. It should be 
noted that there is no contradiction whatsoever 
between correct democratic theory and efforts to 
upgrade the quality of policy élites, including 
politicians. Indeed, in many developing coun-
tries intensive efforts to improve policy élites 
are essential, ranging from ways of motivating 
bright young persons to move into politics and 
policy-related activities, up to adjustments of 
electoral procedures to improve the quality of 
successful candidates. Within the limited scope 
of this article, the only proposal that will be put 
forward in this respect is the establishment of 
national policy schools, which are particularly 
pertinent to planning and relatively more feasi-
ble as well as faster in producing results than 
other approaches. However, the need for a 
broader approach to upgrading policy élites as an 
essential factor in development should be kept in 
mind. 
Proposition 3: 
Much attention and effort should be directed towards 
upgrading policy élites, including, politicians 
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Proposition 4: 
National policy schools should be set up as an integral 
part of the effort to upgrade planning 
The idea of national policy schools is simple, 
although implementation is difficult. Selected 
groups of various policy-makers and policy-
influencers should spend a period of four to six 
weeks working together, full time, on a deep 
analysis of major national policy issues, with 
professional inputs to be provided by experts. 
Participants should include a mixture of poli-
ticians, civil servants, planners and other policy 
professionals, military officers, trade-union and 
employer-organization leaders, mass media 
commentators, etc. Products of the proposed 
national policy, schools include the upgrading of 
participants' knowledge, as well as greater 
consensus. 
The subjects to be dealt with at the national 
policy schools would overlap the main planning 
concerns; the methods to be presented would 
relate to advanced planning methodology. Con-
clusions from projects undertaken at the schools 
could serve as inputs for planning. 
Details of structure, staffing, location and 
content of the national policy schools would 
depend on particular country situations. In prin-
ciple, however, it is the author's view that such 
schools are essential in many countries in order 
to build up the political culture infrastructure 
which is basic to planning, as well as to high-
quality policy-making and the capacity to govern 
in general. 
Proposition "): 
Planning must he integrated into current and crisis decision-making 
Unless planning is integrated into current 
decision-making, its content may become distan-
ced from reality and its impacts on governmen-
tal behaviour may approximate zero. This is 
illustrated in the extreme situation of crisis 
decision-making. In quite a number of countries, 
important decisions are taken under conditions 
of economic and debt-handling crises. Unless 
planning serves as a sort of a "compass" that will 
provide guidance in such cases, it will not fulfill 
its essential role as an important aid to decision-
making and its impact on reality will be much 
reduced. Therefore, planning must be integra-
ted, inter alia, into crisis decision-making. This 
can be done in various ways, such as: the pre-
assignment of appropriate roles to senior plan-
ning officials in crisis-management teams; the 
participation of planning officials in designing 
and running crisis decision-making systems; and 
the preparation of contingency plans for crisis 
scenarios in the planning units and with their 
participation. First, however, the principle that 
planning should aid in and influence crisis 
decision-making must be accepted. 
Crisis decision-making is an important but 
special case of the integration of planning. More 
regular modes of introducing planning into 
policy-making include: opportunities for plan-
ners to comment on important decisions on the 
agendas of governments and top decision-
makers; the interlocking of the budget process 
with the planning process, without losing the 
distinct nature either; suitable procedures for 
considering planning recommendations at the 
highest level; etc. The details will need to be 
adapted to particular circumstances but, in prin-
ciple, institutionalized modes for integrating 
planning into current decision-making are a 
must. Good informal interlocking is also desira-
ble and often essential, but inadequate by itself. 
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Proposition 6: 
Planning must be detached, at least in part, from "the heat of the moment" 
Three basic causes of the main policy-reasoning 
weaknesses are: a) ignorance of relevant facts 
and information: b) inherent difficulties in rea-
soning on complex situations involving much 
incertainty, value conflicts, multiple variables, 
etc.; and c) "motivated irrationality", i.e., the 
impact of strong emotions, hopes, feelings, 
ideologies and similar "hot" variables on reason-
ing (Pears, 1984; Dror, in preparation). 
One of the main functions of planning is to 
counteract and overcome these prevalent wea-
knesses in policy-making. In particular, plan-
ning should be "cold", in the sense of a detached 
handling of issues, however emotionally 
charged, even while being strongly committed to 
national goals and development. To meet this 
requirement, planning must, at least in part, be 
detached from the "heat" characteristic of the 
central mind of governments and the corridors 
of powers. 
Proposition 7: 
In order to cope with the antimony posed by propositions 5 and 6, a set of 
"planning" units is essential, ranging from advisory units serving 
those who govern to think tanks. These units should constitute 
a network as well as an informal school 
The combination of propositions 5 and 6 implies 
that planning must meet contradictory 
demands: it must be well integrated into the 
central mind of government and share in the 
"heat" of the corridors of powers, while also 
having the ability to remain aloof, at times, from 
the system. This paradox cannot be coped with 
satisfactorily within any one unit or process. 
Therefore, "planning" must be divided among a 
range of units, each having a double mission, 
which add up to an aggregated planning activity 
providing a good mix of contradictory processes. 
Therefore, a "planning cluster" rather than a 
single "planning centre" is needed. 
To illustrate the range of components 
needed in such a planning cluster, let us discuss 
briefly two of its main elements, which have 
many contrasting features, but which are both 
essential and can complement one another: at 
one extreme, "planning" requires high-quality 
advisory units that serve those who govern; at 
the other extreme, "planning" requires detached 
policy research and development organizations 
analogous to think tanks. Various intermediate 
entities, such as planning units in the main min-
istries, are also needed, but the advisory units, at 
one extreme, and the think tanks, at the other, do 
serve to illustrate the multiple elements essen-
tial to a well-performing planning cluster. 
A variety of planning units can be integrated 
within a central ministry of planning, but more 
is needed, even if the ministry may serve as the 
centre of the planning cluster. To achieve coher-
ence, the various planning units and planning 
professionals should constitute a network and an 
informal school in addition to various formal 
co-ordination and integration procedures and 
structures. 
Proposition 8: 
A planning core, constituting a central "island of 
excellence" having special features, is essential 
The planning cluster requires a core which con-
stitutes an "island of excellence" and which 
serves as the central "planning brain". When a 
distinct planning ministry exists, the core plan-
ning unit should be located within it; but it is not 
identical with the ministry as a whole, which 
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usually also engages in many other necessary 
activities, such as detailed project programming 
and evaluation. 
To meet the needs of planning for develop-
ment, such as methodological sophistication and 
multi-disciplinary knowledge and perspectives, 
as will be discussed under some of the following 
propositions, the core planning "island of excel-
lence" must be of the highest quality and truly 
interdisciplinary in its composition. Its own 
planning processes need constant monitoring 
and improvement. The quality of the planning 
core's "island of excellence" is critical in deter-
mining the quality and utility of the planning 
process as a whole and therefore merits a great 
deal of attention. This is all the more true in view 
of the author's empirical finding that existing 
planning ministries usually do not meet the 
requirements of a central planning core "island 
of excellence". 
Proposition 9: 
The main task of central planning, and especially its core unit, is the 
design and evaluation of global strategies for development 
Many planning activities involve efforts to 
optimize what are actually sinking curves, while 
what is often needed are novel global develop-
ment strategies which can transform present 
declining trends and break out of decaying situa-
tions. Therefore, the main task of central plan-
ning is the design and evaluation of overall 
strategies for development. 
The substantive contents of global develop-
ment strategies are outside the scope of this 
article. Nevertheless, it will be helpful to illus-
trate some of their facets, which require central 
planning management and innovative design: 
— The proper role of free markets and their 
limitations; 
— Shock s t r a t e g i e s v e r s u s ba lanced 
development approaches; 
— Large-scale national projects (yes or no, 
and which ones?); 
— Sectoral priorities and their instruments; 
— External economic relations and debt-
management strategies; 
— Employment and social policies, and their 
relation to economic policies, as discussed 
further later on; 
— Long-range infrastructure policies; 
— Cultural aspects of "development", 
"productivity", etc., which will be 
examined; 
— Policies designed to encourage innovation; 
— Regional markets and other forms of 
multi-national co-operation. 
E x p e r i e n c e s in J a p a n , the newly 
industrialized nations, France and others show 
that the design of suitable global development 
strategies, in principle, is not impossible. 
However, the challenge is a very considerable 
one. Therefore planning, as a main mode for 
successfully meeting the development challenge, 
must be of very high quality; otherwise it may do 
much more harm than good. Especially when 
trends are on a declining curve, as they are now, 
—planning must concentrate on global 
development strategies which will permit 
breakthroughs to be made in the transformation 
of these trends, rather than on incremental 
improvisation. This most difficult task, 
involving —as it sometimes does— intervention 
in deeply-rooted adverse processes, and bold 
steps designed to "throw history a curve", 
underscores the need for core-planning "islands 
of excellence". 
Proposition 10: 
Innovativeness and "policy-gambling" are essential planning qualifications 
The need for an outstanding quality of planning development is further illustrated by two 
as a precondition of its usefulness for additional requirements, namely innovativeness 
GOVERNABIUTY, PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF PLANNING / Y. Dror 101 
and "policy-gambling". 
Apply ing a modern philosophy-of-
knowledge approach (Munz, 1985), two 
different phases of development policy-making 
can be distinguished: a) the invention of new 
options; and b) the screening of the options and 
their "confirmation" or "refutation" by reality. 
The present situation of many developing 
countries, including those of Latin America and 
the Caribbean, requires —first of all— the 
invention and design of new global development 
strategy options, all the existing ones being of 
doubtful usefulness at best. Therefore , 
innovativeness must be a main feature of 
adequate p lann ing . This is a difficult 
requirement to meet, however, because it goes 
beyond conventional professional knowledge 
and is dependent upon unusual persons and 
The need for innovativeness and the view of 
planning as policy-gambling are but two 
illustrations out of many of why the skills of 
planning professionals must be upgraded. 
Despite some pioneering efforts, some of them 
in Latin America (e.g., the experimental 
programme of the Escuela de Ciencias y Técnicas 
de Gobierno in Caracas), the present training of 
planners does not prepare them adequately for 
their real tasks and they thus lack essential 
knowledge and methods. Therefore, upgrading 
planners' knowledge and revising the way 
planning professionals think (Schon, 1983) are 
necessary steps, as is an adjustment in the 
Moving on from the "capacity to govern" and 
related planning issues to the question of partici-
pation, the inadequacies of any "command" 
upon organizational climates and social 
conditions which will encourage innovation. 
The "policy-gambling" aspect of planning is 
different, but no less demanding. Because of 
environmental turbulence and "ultra-change" 
(that is, change in the patterns of change itself), 
planning must cope with much uncertainty; this 
includes both "hard" uncertainty, which is 
inherent in the processes involved and therefore 
cannot be reduced, and " t r a scenden t " 
uncertainty, relating to the very shape of 
possible futures rather than merely their 
probabilities. Consequently, all decisions are in 
essence "blin4 gambles" to some extent, and 
planning is largely a policy-gambling and policy-
gambling-aiding activity. This view of planning 
has far-reaching implications for its methods, its 
relations with politicians, its educational 
functions and its very nature. 
planning expectations of the main policy-
makers and relevant publics. 
In the longer run, novel types of public 
policy and planning schools will be necessary, 
perhaps on a regional level. To provide urgently 
required knowledge and skills, however, crash-
programmes are needed which will rapidly 
update the skills of existing professionals and 
provide some insights to the main policy-
makers. A modular approach of intensive 
training based on a series of workshops 
interpolated with sessions of active learning may 
provide a solution which rapidly upgrades 
planner*' skills in feasible a way. 
approach must be recognized. Without dispara-
ging the importance and, often, necessity of 
State guidance in many developing countries, 
Proposition 11: 
Planning professionals need a great deal of improvement 
Proposition 12: 
A quasi-corporate approach, with the main economic and social bodies 
participating in the planning process, is often preferable, but 
central decision-making authority must be preserved 
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once very primitive conditions have been over-
come and autonomous social and economic insti-
tutions exist, a co-operative approach involving 
all the main actors is essential for development 
planning if it is to have positive effects on 
reality. 
Therefore, some variation of the quasi-
corporate approach is recommended. Quite a 
number of illuminating models are to be found 
in France, the Netherlands, Austria, Japan, the 
newly industrialized nations of eastern Asia and, 
in a different form, some projects in the United 
States. The quasi-corporate structure must be 
fitted to the particularities of each country but, as 
a minimum, it should include an integrating 
mechanism covering the main social and econo-
To upgrade "participation" while also reducing 
overloads on central planning and assuring a 
better fit with local conditions, detailed planning 
and its implementation should be delegated to 
regional and local units, subject to safeguards 
against exaggerated "localism" and the erosion 
of essential central controls. The promotion of 
innovativeness also requires the encouragement 
of grass roots entrepreneurship. These princi-
ples also fit in well with and supplement a mixed 
market-economy development strategy, in 
which many functions are left to a semi-
autonomous market. 
To move in such directions, a number of 
steps must be taken which go beyond formal 
decisions and symbolic declarations. In particu-
lar, some of the measures required are: 
Continuing along the lines of proposition 13, the 
need for a consistent policy on the role of the 
market should be underscored, especially in view 
mic actors on the political level, and a professio-
nal network of planning and similar units in the 
main social and economic organizations on the 
operational level. 
Care must be taken, however, to ensure that 
the government does not fall captive to social 
and economic interests, which often are inertia-
prone (Olsen, 1982). Reliance on market proces-
ses and corporate arrangements must be 
balanced by preserving and upgrading the auto-
nomy of the State, including its planning pro-
cess. This subject requires separate 
consideration, but should be kept in mind when 
various forms of "participation" and their 
expansion are considered. 
a) An actual transfer of power and resources to 
autonomous actors; 
b) A readiness to tolerate and even encourage 
risk-taking and mistakes, as long as certain 
limits are respected; 
c) Determined action to reduce intervention by 
central units, even if this entails side-
stepping formal policies, so that local 
initiatives will not be hindered. 
Implementation of such a meta-planning 
(i.e., planning of planning) policy is difficult, as 
is interestingly illustrated under the different, 
but still relevant, conditions of the People's 
Republic of China. A strong political will is 
essential in order to actually move in the direc-
tion of planning delegation. 
of the tendency to swing between reducing the 
role of the market and intervening in details, on 
the one hand, and eliminating needed controls, 
Proposition 13: 
Detailed planning and its implementation should be delegated with a 
view to encouraging "grass-roots" initiative and autonomy 
Proposition 14: 
Tendencies to control the market or to rely on it too much, as well 
as wild fluctuations between these extremes, should be avoided 
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on the other hand, as a result of various pres-
sures, short-range considerations and panicky 
decision-making. Predictability and some stabil-
ity are essential prerequisites of adequate market 
operations. This makes a consistent policy on 
To balance reliance on participation and on 
market processes, it is necessary to bear in mind 
that major development projects and global 
strategies may require direct governmental 
action. Such action often cannot be left to exist-
ing bureaucratic structures, which may be quite 
unable to carry out innovative and large-scale 
development activities and projects. 
In addition to semi-corporate co-operation with 
the main social and economic intítutions, mass 
participation is essential for effective develop-
ment. The unavoidable interim costs of the 
necessary "constructive destruction" make 
mobilization of mass support all the more essen-
tial in many Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. 
The requirements of mass participation lead 
from planning into politics and point up the 
need for "charisma" and visionary leadership as 
essential factors in the success of ambitious 
development endeavours. This topic goes 
Social policies in the broadest sense of the term, 
must play a part in development planning due to 
at least three types of reasons: 
the roles of the market all the more necessary. 
Possible biases of planners towards either 
extreme must be counteracted, and any change in 
market roles should be very carefully evaluated 
before approval. 
Reform of public bureaucracies as a whole is 
at best a very slow process and often a hopeless 
one under real conditions. Therefore, the setting 
up of special organizations with a strong value-
commitment to novel development policies and 
projects is often essential for the implementa-
tion of innovative plans. Such implementation 
tools should be carefully considered within the 
planning process itself. 
beyond the scope of this article, but these ele-
ments should be recognized as an essential polit-
ical basis for effective planning which deserve 
separate consideration. 
Within the narrower perspectives of plan-
ning, some things can still be done: planning 
should provide "realistic visions" and should 
engage in enlightening activities directed at 
mobilizing broad support. The activities of the 
Planning Council of New Zealand provide some 
examples of ways in which planners can 
enlighten and inform the public about given 
policies. 
a) In terms of values, development aims 
ultimately at providing a "good society" and at 
satisfying human individual and collective needs. 
Proposition 15: 
The implementation of major "breakthrough" projects calls for the 
creation of special organizations for that purpose 
Proposition 16: 
Building up public identification with development strategies is a must. 
This involves: a) realistic visions and) public enlightenment 
Proposition 17: 
Social policies constitute an essential element of planning, 
both as a goal and as an instrument 
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Therefore, broad social aims should serve as a 
guide for much of development planning. 
b) "Development" depends heavily on socie-
tal factors, including possible cultural prerequi-
sites for technological modernization (compare 
Wienner, 1980; Marx, 1964; Morishima, 1982). 
Bearing this fact in mind, it is the author's belief 
that a seminar should be held as soon as possible 
to consider such a "cultural requisite" approach 
to development in the Latin American and 
Caribbean context. The complex individual 
aspects of "modernity" (Inkeles, 1983) are 
another important factor. 
c) Tactically, visible social justice and an 
equitable sharing of the burdens of development 
are essential for mobilizing support, in addition 
to their inherent value justification. 
Additional social requirements of develop-
ment include human capital production, propen-
sities to learn and to invest, etc. Taken together, 
such considerations make social policy an inte-
gral and central dimension of planning for 
development. This, in turn, requires many 
changes in the professional composition and 
qualifications of planning units, reinforcing ear-
lier propositions along these lines. 
Proposition 18: 
Political stability and the containment of social violence are essential. This 
returns us to the necessity of undertaking improvements in planning 
within a broad context of building up the capacity to govern 
This last proposition returns to the starting 
point, i.e., putting the improvement of planning 
within the broad context of the capacity to gov-
ern. Unless a considerable degree of political 
stability is assured and social violence is con-
tained, planning for development will be largely 
in vain. Therefore, when necessary, efforts 
should first be concentrated on increasing politi-
cal stability and reducing social violence. These 
two factors, in turn, depend in part on successful 
development, as much political instability and 
social violence stem from economic backward-
ness, frustrated aspirations and subjective depri-
vation. There is thus a hidden snare in this 
situation: the improvement of political stability 
and containment of social violence depend on 
successful development, but successful develop-
ment depends, in turn, on the existence of politi-
cal stability and the containment of social 
violence. 
In situations where political instability and 
social violence inhibit development, their elimi-
nation should constitute primary goals for plan-
ning; efforts to achieve these objectives will, in 
turn, involve introducing additional dimensions 
and needed qualifications. Even in many Latin 
American and Caribbean countries where the 
political situation at present is stable and social 
violence is very limited, the spectre of the possi-
ble re-emergence of these problems should not 
be lost from sight and their prevention must be 
an important consideration in planning. This 
leads into important and sometimes crucial 
issues which warrant separate consideration. 
Conclusion 
It is hoped that the 18 propositions set forth 
above, however rudimentary, will serve the pur-
pose of posing some of the main issues of 
"governability, participation and social aspects 
of planning". Their presentation has been short 
and to the point in the interest of brevity and 
with a view to stimulating discussion. 
GOVERNABILITY, PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF PLANNING / Y. Dror 105 
Bibliographical references 
Dror, Y. (1986): Policymaking Under Adversity, New Bruns-
wick, New Jersey: Transaction Books. 
(in preparation): Notes Towards a Philosophy of Policy-
Reasoning. 
Inkeles, A., ed. (1983): Exploring Individual Modernity, New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Marx, 4.. (1964): The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the 
Pastoral Ideal in America, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Morishima, M. (1982): Why Japan "succeeded"? Western Tech-
nology and the ¡apáñese V.thos, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Munz, P. (1985): Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge: 
Popper or Wittgenstein.3. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, especially chapter 6. 
Olsen, M. (1982): The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic 
Growth. Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, New Haven 
Conn.; Yale University Press. 
Pears, D. (1984): Motivated irrationality. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Schon, D. (1983): The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals 
Think in Action. New York: Basic Books. 
Wienner, M. (1980): English Culture and the Decline of the 
Industrial Spirit, 1950-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
